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Fifth Circuit Relies on Administrative Standards in 
School Desegregation Cases-Singleton v. Jackson 
Municipal Separate School District* 
On June 22, 1965, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
entered an order requiring the Jackson, Mississippi, Municipal 
Separate School District to submit a plan for the total desegregation 
of the district, and specifically requiring that at least four grades be 
desegregated in the school year 1965-1966.1 In reaching its decision, 
the court gave "great weight"2 to the standards used by the Office of 
Education of the United States Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare (HEW) to determine whether schools qualify for federal 
financial assistance. The court reasoned that since the objectives of 
both the j1,1diciary and the executive department in requiring the 
desegregation of public schools are the same, there should also be a 
correlation bet\v-een the standards each employs.8 This conclusion 
raises the question of the extent to which HEW's standards are to be 
relied on by the courts in their independent evaluations of school 
desegregation plans. There would seem to be three possible alterna-
tives: (1) use of the HEW standards merely as additional evidence, to 
be evaluated and weighed by the courts; (2) acceptance of the HEW 
standards as controlling upon the courts; or (3) acceptance of HEW's 
actions based on its' standards as dispositive of the particular case. 
• 348 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1965). 
1. Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School Dist., 348 F.2d 729 (5th Cir •. 
1965) (hereinafter cited as principal case). The plaintiffs were Negro parents seeking 
injunctive relief pending an appeal on the adequacy of a grade-a-year school deseg-
regation plan. 
. 2. Id. at 781. 
8. Ibid. 
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The interaction of the Fifth Circuit and HEW is the culmination 
of the development, during the past twelve years, of both judicial and 
administrative review of school desegration plans. When the United 
States Supreme Court held racial discrimination in public schools 
unconstitutional in Brown v. Board of Education,4 it remanded the 
cases to the federal district courts with instructions to supervise the 
local school boards' implementations of the principles enunciated 
in that decision.6 Although the courts were at first reluctant to exer-
cise their new respqnsibility,6 the period from 1954 to 1964 was one 
of stumbling progress. The successive downward revisions in judicial 
estimates of the amount of time needed by the school boards to com-
ply fully with Brown have typified the increasingly stricter standards 
employed by the courts in evaluating all aspects of the proposed 
plans.7 Although the courts at first accepted and even suggested the 
"stair-step" or grade-a-year plans,8 by 1961 such plans had fallen into 
disfavor;9 "the rule [had] become: the later the start, the shorter the 
time allowed for transition."10 Subsequently, some of the courts re-
quired desegregation of two grades per year while others demanded 
three or four.11 By 1964, many of the courts had gained, through ten 
years of experimentation, sufficient competence and confidence to 
deal knowledgeably and effectively with recalcitrant school districts.12 
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
5. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). Although the Supreme Court 
recognized the right to be free from segregation in the public schools in the first Brown 
case, supra note 4, it requested additional argument on the appropriate means of imple-
menting that right. The choice available to the Court was either immediate or gradual 
desegregation; enforcement could come through decrees formulated by the Supreme 
Court, by a master appointed by the Court, or by the federal district courts. 349 U.S. 
at 298 n.2. The decision to remand to the district courts evidenced a realization by the 
Supreme Court that a single plan administered in Washington would have been in-
appropriate, if not impossible. Id. at 299. See 49 Nw. U.L. R.Ev. 557 (1954). 
6. E.g., Rippy v. Borders, 250 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1957); Orleans Parish School Bd. 
v. Bush, 242 F.2d 156 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 921 (1957). 
7. See generally Knowles, School Desegregation, 42 N.C.L. R.Ev. 67 (1963); Meador, 
The Constitution and the Assignment of Pupils to Public Schools, 45 VA. L. R.Ev. 517 
(1959). 
8. E.g., Boson v. Rippy, 285 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1960); Houston Independent School 
Dist. v. Ross, 282 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1960); Kelley v. Board of Educ., 159 F. Supp. 272 
(M.D. Tenn. 1958), aff d, 270 F.2d 209 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 924 (1959). 
9. E.g., Jackson v. School Bd., 321 F.2d 230 (4th Cir. 1963); Bush v. Orleans Parish 
School Bd., 308 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1962); Goss v. Board of Educ., 301 F.2d 164 (6th Cir. 
1962); Evans v. Ennis, 281 F.2d 385 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 933 (1961). 
10. Lockett v. Board of Educ., 342 F.2d 225, 228 (5th Cir. 1965). 
11. E.g., Northcross v. Board of Educ., 333 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1964); Stell v. 
Savannah-Chatham County Bd. of Educ., 333 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1964); Gaines v. Board 
of Educ., 329 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1964); Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 229 F. Supp. 
580 (WD. Tenn. 1964). 
12. The very nature of the judicial process results in a disparity of expertise among 
the various courts. First, since the courts deal only with the cases brought before them, 
some courts have had no exposure, and therefore no experience, during the ten-year 
period. Second, it is an unfortunate result of the adversary process that uninformed 
or poorly prepared counsel often leads to an uninformed court and an uninformed 
342 Michigan Law Review [Vol.64 
The accelerated pace set by judicial action was supplemented by 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which evidenced a national consensus 
against discrimination in education.18 Pursuant to Title VI,14 which 
prohibits the expenditure of federal funds for programs administered 
in a ra_cially discriminatory manner, HEW conditioned eligibility 
for federal aid on an assurance of compliance with the provisions of 
the act.15 Elementary and secondary school boards could satisfy this 
requirement either by assuring HEW that they would comply with 
an existing final court order or, in the absence of such an order, sub-
mitting a desegregation plan acceptable to the Commissioner of Edu-
cation.16 To assist the Commissioner and the school boards in evalu-
ating desegregation plans, HEW published in April 1965 an official 
policy statement in the form of Guidelines.17 The Guidelines are 
both comprehensive and demanding; although the provisions allow 
some flexibility, the target date for total desegregation of pupils, 
teachers, and activities is the fall of 1967 .18 
decision. Thus, while some courts have learned a great deal during the period of 
experimentation, others have not been so fortunate. Most of the courts arc aware of 
the more obvious ploys used to delay desegregation, but only a few are sufficiently 
competent to detect the more subtle means of evasion. 
13. 78 Stat. 246-49, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c (1964). 
14. 7S Stat. 252-53, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964). Section 601 states: "No person in 
the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded 
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination 
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Section 602 
states: "Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal 
financial assistance to any program or activity ••• is authorized and directed to effectu-
ate the provisions of section 601 with respect to such program or activity by issuing 
rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be consistent with 
achievement of the objectives or the statute authorizing the financial assistance in 
connection with which the action is taken. • • ." 
15. 45A C.F.R. § 80.4(a) (1964): "Every application for Federal financial assistance to 
carry out a program to which this part applies ••• shall, as a condition to its approval 
••. , contain or be accompanied by an assurance that the program will be conducted 
or the facility operated in compliance-with all requirements imposed by or pursuant 
to this part. . . .'' 
16. 45A C.F.R. § 80.4(c) (1964). 
17. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, OFFICE OF EDUCATION, 
GENERAL. STATEMENT OF POUCIES UNDER TITLE VI OF TiiE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 
R.Esl'ECTING DESEGREGATION OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS, April 1965 (herc-
inaner cited as GumEUNES). 
18. The Guidelines require that all plans include provisions for the desegregation 
of teachers and administrative personnel, for the desegregation of school transporta• 
tion and other school-affiliated facilities or activities, and for conspicuous notice in 
the community of the school board's actions. Plans based on geographic attendance 
zones must include maps and statistics. Plans based on "freedom of choice" must pro-
vide for adequate opportunity to make a choice, and for adequate notice; they must 
also contain provisions for procedure in the event of overcrowding. While the target 
date for total desegregation for all plans is 1967, each school district failing to provide 
for total desegregation by the school year 1965-1966 must justify the delay. Those 
schools which are just beginning to desegregate must make a substantial good faith 
start, which would include at least four grades for 1965-1966 and a right for every 
student, whether or not his grade has been desegregated, to transfer in order to take a 
course for which he is qualified and which is not available in the school he is attending. 
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Since HEW and the judiciary are pursuing the same ultimate 
objective, it is not surprising that the formats of their standards are 
quite similar. The courts' target date for total desegregation is 1968-
1969 while that of HEW is 1967-1968; both, however, require the 
desegregation of a minimum of four grades in 1965-1966 for those 
school districts which, as of the fall of 1965, have taken no steps 
toward desegregation.19 Neither objects to allowing:the school boards 
to select either freedom-of-choice plans or geographic plans based on 
nonracial attendance zones.20 Other areas of similarity include an 
insistence on a good faith start, an emphasis on adequate notice to 
the community, and a concern for the possible overcrowding of the 
better schools.21 
The principal-case is the first case which deals directly with the 
relationship between the HEW standards and those developed by 
the courts. The Circuit Court's reference to the Office of Education 
as the "better qualified" and "more appropriate federal body"22 to 
evaluate school plans would seem to suggest a willingness on the part 
of the court to rely totally on the HEW Guidelines, and subsequent 
statements of the Fifth Circuit have reinforced this suggestion. In 
Price v. Denison,23 the court indicated that Singleton's implementa-
tion of HEW's standards would be a typical approach in desegre-
gation cases,24 and added: 
By the 1964 Act and the action of HEW, administration is 
largely where it ought to be-in the hands of the Executive and 
its agencies with the function of the Judiciary confined to those 
rare cases presenting justiciable, not operational, questions.25 
Furthermore, there is evidence that the district courts may read 
Singleton as permitting, if not requiring, complete judicial reliance 
not only on the HEW Guidelines, but also on HEW's actions. For 
example, in the District Court for the Western District of Mississippi, 
Judge Clayton held in abeyance his ruling on a motion for a pre-
liminary injunction against the Aberdeen Municipal Separate School 
District pending a decision by the Commissioner of Education on the 
adequacy in light of the HEW Guidelines of the plan submitted by 
19. Compare Lockett v. Board of Educ., 342 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1965), with GUIDE-
LINES, pt. VE. . 
· 20. Compare Bradley v. School Bd., 345 F.2d 310 (4th Cir. 1965), and Northcross 
v. Board of Educ., 333 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1964), with GumEI.INES, pt. VA. 
21. Compare Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Bd. ·of Educ., 333 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 
1964), and Gaines v. Dougherty County Bd. of Educ., 334 F.2d 983 (5th Cir. 1964), 
with GumEI.INES, pts. VB4, VD. 
22. Principal case at 731. 
23. 348 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1965). Appellants were Negro parents questioning the 
constitutional adequacy of Denison school district's grade-a-year plan. 
24. Id. at 1013. 
25. Id. at 1014. 
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the school board.26 Arguments on this motion were made shortly 
before the opening of school in September; any delay in a decision 
could only add to the difficulties of implementing that decision be-
fore the fall term began. It seems highly probable that Judge Clay-
ton's reason for delaying his decision was a belief that the forth-
coming HEW ruling would be dispositive of the case. 
Although the courts of the Fifth Circuit have interpreted Single-
ton as permitting judicial abdication to the executive, a more appro-
priate analysis of the case would be that the court was merely taking 
notice of HEW's Guidelines, as it would any findings based upon 
administrative expertise, and considering them in its independent 
evaluation of the facts of the particular case. The judicial relinquish-
ment to the executive department of judicial responsibility for 
evaluating school desegregation plans is understandably appealing 
to the federal judges, particularly those in the southern states; it 
would result in less time spent in actual litigation, less judicial in-
volvement with complex administrative problems, and less direct 
conflict with strong local segregationist sentiment. 'However, despite 
its superficial appeal to the judiciary, such an analysis of Singleton 
ignores the doctrine of separation of powers, the value of the judicial 
process, and the courts' heretofore traditional jealousy of their 
prerogatives. . 
The fourteenth amendment, as interpreted by Brown, is the 
source of the courts' authority, and hence their point of departure, 
for evaluating desegregation plans. On the other hand, HEW's au-
thority is both derived from and limited by legislative fiat. Congress 
authorized the establishment of desegregation guidelines by HEW 
for the purpose of determining which local programs are eligible 
for federal assistance.27 Nowhere in the legislative history of the 
Civil Rights Act is there any evidence of congressional intent to 
make HEW's standards controlling in the desegregation cases stem-
ming from Brown.28 Furthermore, the HEW regulations give both 
26. United States v. Aberdeen Municipal Separate School Dist., Civil No. EC6564, 
N.D. Miss., Sept. 10, 1965. 
27. See note 14 supra. Section 602 of the Civil Rights Act continues: "Compliance with 
any requirement adopted pursuant to this section may be effected (1) by the termina-
tion of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance under such program or activity to 
any recipient as to whom there .has been an express finding on the record, after op• 
portunity for hearing, of a failure to comply with such requirement, ••• (2) by any 
other means authorized by law •••• " 
28. On the contrary, see Title IV of the Civil Rights Act, 78 Stat. 246-49, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000c (1964). Section 407 facilitates the bringing of a desegregation suit in the 
federal courts by authorizing the Attorney General, upon receipt of a written com-
plaint, and upon certifying that the complaint is meritorious, that the signers are 
unable to initiate and maintain legal proceedings and that the institution of the 
action will promote desegregation in the public schools, to bring an appropriate civil 
action in the name of the United States in the appropriate federal district court. If 
the courts arc turning responsibility over to HEW, the Department of Justice now 
need only place a call to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 
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past and future court orders priority over desegregation plans ac-
cepted by the Commissioner of Education,29 thereby evidencing an 
administrative intent to conform administrative action to that of the 
judiciary rather than have the judiciary conform to administrative 
determinations. Thus, the district courts, by construing Singleton as 
an abdication, are given unwarranted status to the Guidelines, which 
have never even been promulgated as official administrative regula-
tions and therefore are, in fact, only an office memorandum. 
School desegregation cases are civil actions in which there exists, 
as a result of Brown, a legal basis for seeking. the enforcement of 
constitutional rights. Interpreting Singleton as calling for total reli-
ance by the courts on the standards promulgated by HEW may result 
in interference with the judicial process established by Brown, to the 
detriment of the real parties in interest-the Negro school children 
and the local school boards. Where the HEW standards are more 
lenient than those normally imposed by the courts, the courts' ac-
ceptance of these standards as ·controlling would delay the school 
children's enjoyment of their recognized rights. For example, al-
though HEW's Guidelines call for the desegregation of at least four 
grades in 1965-1966, HEW has accepted desegregation plans for 1965-
1966 extending to as few as two grades.30 The Guidelines allow for 
such a departure from the general standards only in cases where 
exceptional circumstances can be demonstrated;31 however, convinc-
ing an administrator of the existence of exceptional circumstances in 
an ex parte application is quite different from convincing a federal 
judge of a nondenial of constitutional rights in an adversary pro-
ceeding in which the plaintiff school children's grievances could be 
forcefully presented and where the defendant school board would 
bear the burden of proof.32 Since the school children have no direct 
means of challenging HEW's decisions, to allow HEW's standards 
to be controlling would be to deny to the school children their day 
in court. Conversely, this view of Singleton places the school boards 
at a disadvantage when the HEW standards are higher than those of 
the courts. Failure to satisfy HEW's demands results in the withhold-
ing of federal funds; once the courts incorporate these standards, the 
I ' 
29. "In any case in which a· final order of a court of the United States for the de-
segregation of such school or school system is entered after submission of such a plan, 
such a plan shall be revised to conform to such final order, including any future 
modification of such order." 45A C.F.R. § 80.4(c) (1964). See text accompanying note 14 
~~ , 
30. As of August 13, 1965, of the thirty-two voluntary plans from Mississippi which 
had been accepted by HEW, six extended to only two grades for 1965-1966. DEPART• 
MENT, OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, OFFICE OF EDUCATION, STATUS REPORT, 
COMPLIANCE WITH TITLE VI, 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS Ac:r, Aug. 13, 1965. 
31. "In exceptional cases the Commissioner may, for good cause shown, accept plans 
which provide for desegregation of fewer or other grades or defer other provisions set 
out in 4a above for the 1965-1966 school year ••• .'' GUIDELINES, pt. VE4a(5)(b). 
32. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955). 
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school board may also be liable to civil contempt proceedings for 
noncompliance with an injunctive decree.88 Unlike the children, the 
school boards would be in a position to protest directly to HEW, but 
like the children they would be deprived of a court hearing on the 
question of their compliance with the Brown edict, which is their 
sole constitutional obligation. This leads to the question raised by 
the excerpt quoted above from Price,34 where the court indicated an 
intention to limit itself to "justiciable" questions. The exact meaning 
of this limitation is unclear. If it reserves to the court's jurisdiction 
the types of questions just discussed, it is clearly appropriate; how-
ever, cases decided since Price35 indicate that the district courts are 
not so construing the term "justiciable." 
Another objection is based on the underlying theory of the Brown 
decisions. The Supreme Court there remanded the cases to the dis-
trict courts for retention upon their dockets during the period of 
transition to ensure that the responsibility for desegregation would 
be wi.th the school administrators, supervised on the local level by 
the federal district courts. However, abdication of procedural con-
trol by the courts would mean, for all practical purposes, that an 
agency in Washington would supplant the local courts in supervising 
the local school boards.86 
Finally, Singleton could set a dangerous precedent if interpreted 
as authorizing abdication of judicial responsibility. The courts should 
not be permitted to justify such an abdication in the name of 
efficiency, uniformity, or convenience. To say that there is a national 
consensus is not to say that implementation of that consensus belongs 
in Washington rather than in the federal district courts. Apparently 
the Fifth Circuit views its reliance upon HEW standards as merely 
a question of policy;31 however, in our system of constitutional gov-
ernment, which assigns to each branch distinct functions and duties, 
such questions of "policy" may actually be questions of law. 
33. For example, in United States v. Aberdeen Municipal Separate School Dist., 
Civil No. EC6564, N.D. Miss., Sept. 10, 1965, Judge Clayton, after being advised of 
HEW's rejection of the proposed plan, issued an injunction which imposed a positive 
duty on the school board to comply with each of HEW's specific demands. 
34. Text accompanying note 25 supra. 
35. United States v. Aberdeen Municipal Separate School Dist., Civil No. EC6564, 
N.D. Miss., Sept. 10, 1965; United States v. Carroll County 13d. of Educ., Civil No. 
GC6541, N.D. Miss., preliminary injunction Sept. 2, 1965, desegregation plan approved, 
as modified, Sept. 3, 1965; Baird v. Benton County Bd. of Educ., Civil No. WC6513, 
N.D. Miss., Aug. 6, 1965. 
36. As of Sept. 16, 1965, only 4% of the school districts for which HEW requires a 
plan had failed to submit a plan. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WEL• 
FARE, OFFICE OF EDUCATION, SUMMARY OF COMPLIANCE WITH TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS Ac::r OF 1964, SOUTHERN AND BORDER STATES, Sept. 16, 1965, 
37. See principal case at 731. 
